provision applicable to the dismissal of judges. Therefore, two laws that could have been applicable did not exist. To the contrary, there was only one: article 31 of the LOCNM.”102 95. On this basis, the law in force for the dismissal of judges at the time of the facts was the Organic Law of the National Council of the Judiciary. Moreover, this law was enacted prior to the conduct of which Mr. Cordero Bernal was accused. Consequently, it is not appropriate for the Court to analyze the scope and application of the principle of the application of the most favorable law in this specific case because, when the sanction was imposed, two laws were not in force. B.5 Conclusion 96. Pursuant to the foregoing conclusions, the Court finds that as the decision by which the National Council of the Judiciary dismissed Mr. Cordero Bernal was duly substantiated, and that it was adopted in keeping with the law in force at the time of the facts concerning the dismissal of judges, the State is not responsible for the violation of the right to judicial guarantees in relation to the guarantee of tenure of judges, the principle of legality and the right to have access, under general conditions of equality, to public office established in Articles 8(1), 9 and 23(1) of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of this instrument, to the detriment of Hector Fidel Cordero Bernal. VII-2 JUDICIAL PROTECTION, IN RELATION TO THE OBLIGATIONS TO RESPECT AND TO ENSURE THE RIGHTS AND TO ADOPT DOMESTIC LEGAL PROVISIONS 103 A. Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 97. The Commission argued that the Constitutions and laws of Peru established that the decisions of the National Council of the Judiciary could not be appealed and that the application for amparo was only admissible in cases of violations of due process. It therefore concluded that there was neither an administrative nor judicial remedy to obtain a review of the dismissal ruling. It also indicated that the content of the amparo decisions revealed that the competent organs did not fully examine either the factual or the legal aspects of the decision to dismiss the presumed victim, restricting their competence to matters of due process. 98. The representatives agreed with the arguments presented by the Inter-American Commission. 99. The State argued that, as two independent organs had intervened in the proceeding that resulted in the dismissal (the OCMA and the CNM), this “justified the fact that a judicial review was not required because, otherwise, this would limit the significance and effectiveness of the corresponding decisions issued by the CNM, particularly when the latter had been constitutionally created especially to evaluate whether or not a judge should be dismissed when the law established this and pursuant to a rigorous procedure.” The State also argued that the final decisions concerning the dismissal of judges could be contested in court by the application for amparo, and indicated that this was an appropriate procedure to avoid arbitrary actions and to examine the violation of fundamental rights such as to due process. B. Considerations of the Court 102 Expert opinion provided by Ramón Alberto Huapaya Tapia (evidence file, folio 1856). 103 Article 25 of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of this instrument. 25