The juridical structure of national and international public order is based on this principle, and it permeates the whole legal system.297 270. With regard to indigenous peoples, the Court, in its case law, has specifically established that “it is essential that the States grant effective protection that takes into account their particularities, their economic and social characteristics, and also their situation of special vulnerability, their customary law, values, customs and practices.”298 271. In addition, the Court has indicated that, “the States must abstain from taking measures that are, in any way, directly or indirectly designed to create de jure or de facto situations of discrimination.”299 The States are obliged “to adopt positive measures to reverse or change discriminatory situations that exist in their societies and that prejudice a specific group of people. This includes the special obligation of protection that the State must exercise with regard to acts and practices of third parties who, with its tolerance or acquiescence, create, maintain or promote discriminatory situations.”300 272. Nevertheless, the Court, referring to Articles 1(1) and 24 of the Convention, has indicated that, “the difference between the two articles is that the general obligation contained in Article 1(1) refers to the State’s obligation to respect and ensure ‘without discrimination’ the rights contained in the American Convention[. I]n other words, if a State discriminates in the respect or guarantee of a treaty-based right, it would violate Article 1(1) and the substantial right in question. If, on the contrary, the discrimination refers to unequal protection by domestic law, it would violate Article 24.”301 273. In this case it has been established that the situation of extreme and special vulnerability of the members of the Community is due, inter alia, to the lack of adequate and effective remedies that protect the rights of the indigenous peoples in practice and not just formally; the limited presence of the State institutions that are obliged to provide supplies and services to the members of the Community, particularly food, water, health care and education, and the prevalence of a vision of property that grants greater protection to the private owners over the indigenous peoples’ territorial claims, thus failing to recognize their cultural identity and threatening their physical subsistence. In addition, it has been proved that the declaration of a private nature reserve on part of the land reclaimed by the Community did not take into account its territorial claim and it was not consulted about this declaration. 274. All this reveals de facto discrimination against the members of the Xákmok Kásek Community, which has been marginalized in the enjoyment of the rights that 297 Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 295, para. 101 and Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 23, 2005. Series C No. 127, para. 184. 298 Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 5, para. 63; Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, supra note 16, para. 178, and Case of Tiu Tojín v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 26, 2008. Series C No. 190, para. 96. 299 Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 295, para. 103. 300 Cf. Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, supra note 295, para. 104, and United Nations, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, Nondiscrimination, thirty-seventh session, October 11, 1989, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7. 301 Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica. Advisory Opinion OC-4/84, supra note 294, paras. 53 and 54, and Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Law”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 209. 63