Xákmok Kásek Community, because the administrative decisions were favorable to the Community. The problem was “their total ineffectiveness to obtain the land.” 165. The Commission underscored that the State “did not indicate the precise judicial remedy that was appropriate for this case” and that, contrary to the State’s assertion, the Community “had claimed its land using the available means.” 166. The Court observes that Paraguay has not indicated which legal remedies are supposedly available and effective to guarantee the communal right to land of the indigenous peoples, and has not submitted evidence of their existence in domestic law. 167. In addition, the Court notes that expert witness Enrique Castillo stated that: [Law 904/81] establishes a procedure under administrative law for claiming indigenous lands, which also removes the matter from the ordinary jurisdiction; in other words, from civil proceedings to claim property. In this way, the claims for indigenous property submitted to the State are filed and processed before administrative bodies […]. In view of this legal framework and the practice of the courts, no claims for indigenous lands are processed through the ordinary justice system.”185 168. Therefore, the Court concludes that Paraguay has not proved the existence of any other procedure that would be effective to provide a definitive solution to the claim filed by the Xákmok Kásek Community. * * * 169. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the arguments submitted by the State to justify its failure to realize the alleged victims’ right to property were insufficient to relieve it of its international responsibility. Indeed, certain acts and omissions by the State, far from contributing to the realization of the right to property of the members of the Community, have obstructed and prevented it. Thus the declaration of a private nature reserve on part of the territory claimed by the Community (supra para. 80) not only prevented them from carrying out their traditional activities on that land, but also its expropriation and occupation under any circumstance (supra para. 82). The observations of expert witness Rodolfo Stavenhagen, which were not contradicted by the State, are of particular concern to the Court. He stated that the said declaration as a protected wooded area could constitute a new and sophisticated mechanism adopted by the private owners of land claimed by indigenous communities “to obstruct the land claims of the original peoples […] using legal mechanisms and even invoking purposes as virtuous as the conservation of the environment.”186 170. Consequently, the Court concludes that the administrative action filed to recover the 10,700 hectares (supra 67 and 68) that correspond to the traditional lands that are most suitable for the settlement of the Community was not conducted with due diligence, was not processed in a reasonable time, was ineffective, and did not offer the Community a real possibility to recover its traditional lands. In addition, the Paraguayan domestic authorities, especially the Congress of the Republic, have considered the issue of indigenous territory exclusively from the perspective of the productivity of the land, disregarding the inherent particularities of the Xákmok Kásek community and the special relationship of its members with the land claimed. Lastly, the State completely ignored the indigenous claim when it declared part of that 185 Cf. Expert opinion of Enrique Castillo in the Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 5 (merits file, tome I, folio 296). 186 Cf. Expert testimony of Rodolfo Stavenhagen, supra note 17, folio 640. 39