2 is creating a ius constitutionale commune in the subject of human rights for the American continent, or at least, for Latin America (paras. 85 to 88). II. PRELIMINARY OBJECTION OF “FOURTH INSTANCE” AND “CONTROL OF COMPLIANCE” 4. The respondent State asserted the preliminary objection of the I/A Court of H.R.’s lack of jurisdiction given that it considered that what was intended for the international instance consisted in reviewing the criminal procedures that were followed by all competent judicial instances at the domestic level, where remedies (appeals) were also filed, as were amparo appeal hearings; moreover, it is affirmed that the “control of compliance” was exercised ex officio, which makes the InterAmerican Court incompetent in that it cannot “review” that which was adjudicated and decided previously by the domestic judges whom applied conventional parameters, that is, parameters that fall within treaty obligations. This argument regarding the prior exercise of the “control of compliance” in the domestic forum, as a preliminary exception, is innovative and was the subject of special attention by the judges of the I/A Court of H.R. 5. In principle, we must remember that the I/A Court of H.R. has held that “if the State has violated its international obligations due to the actions of its judicial bodies, this may lead the [Inter-American] Court to examine the respective domestic processes to establish their compatibility with the American Convention,3 that which may possibly include the decisions of higher courts.”4 6. In this regard, although there is constant jurisprudence on preliminary objections regarding the “fourth instance,” this is the first time that it is argued that domestic courts effectively exercised the “control of compliance” in an ordinary [civil] process that was followed in all the instances, including the ordinary and extraordinary remedies filed, which cannot thereby be analyzed by the judges of the Inter-American Court upon implying a revision of that decided by the domestic courts that applied Inter-American norms. As such, the I/A Court of H.R. reiterates that although international protection in the form of a convention reinforc[es] or complement[s] the protection provided by the domestic law of the American states,” as stated in the Preamble to the American Convention on Human Rights (principle of subsidiarity that has also been recognized from its initial jurisprudence),5 the fact is that in order to carry out an evaluative analysis of the compliance with certain international obligations, “there is an intrinsic relationship between an analysis of international and domestic law.” (para. 16 of the Judgment). 3 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63, para. 222; Case of Escher et al. v. Brazil. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 6, 2009. Series C No. 200, para. 44, and Case of Da Costa Cadogan v. Barbados. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 24, 2009, Series C No. 204, para. 12. 4 Cf. Case of Gomes Lund et al. (“Guerrilha do Araguala”) v. Brazil. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 24, 2010, para. 49. 5 Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para. 61: “The rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies allows the State to resolve the problem under its domestic law before being confronted with an international proceeding. This is particularly true in the international jurisdiction of human rights, because the latter ‘reinforces or complements’ the domestic jurisdiction (American Convention, Preamble).”