14 effects. This involves a general declaration of invalidity for nonconformity with the Convention of the national standard. 37. Instead, the intensity of the "diffused control of conformity with the Convention" will diminish in those systems where the "diffused control of constitutionality" is not allowed, and therefore, not all judges have the power to stop enforcing a law to a specific case. In these cases it is obvious that the judges who lack such jurisdiction, shall exercise the "diffused control of conformity with the Convention" with less intensity, without this implying that they can not do so "within their respective jurisdictions.” This implies that they can not fail to apply the norm (even though they may not have that power), and shall, in any case, make a "standard interpretation" of it, that is, make a "consistent interpretation," not only of the national Constitution, but also of the American Convention and the jurisprudence of the Convention. This interpretation requires a creative action in order to achieve compatibility of the national standard in accordance with the conventional parameter and thus achieve the realization of the right or freedom in question, with the broadest and most encompassing reach in terms of the pro homine principle. 38. In this regard, upon carrying out an “examination of compatibility with the Convention,” the domestic judge must always apply the pro homine principle (enshrined in Article 29 of the Pact of San José), which implies, inter alia, to implement the most favorable interpretation for the use and enjoyment of fundamental rights and freedoms;51 being able to also opt for the interpretation that is most favorable in regard to its applicability with the American Convention and other international human rights treatises. The I/A Court of H.R. has indicated this, noting that:52 51. With respect to the comparison between the American Convention and the other treaties already mentioned, the Court cannot avoid a comment concerning an interpretation suggested by Costa Rica in the hearing of November 8, 1985. According to this argument, if a right recognized by the American Convention were regulated in a more restrictive way in another international human rights instrument, the interpretation of the American Convention would have to take those additional restrictions into account for the following reasons: If it were not so, we would have to accept that what is legal and permissible on the universal plane would constitute a violation in this hemisphere, which cannot obviously be correct. We think rather that with respect to the interpretation of treaties, the criterion can be established that the rules of a treaty or a convention must be interpreted in relation with the provisions that appear in other treaties that cover the same subject. It can also be contended that the 51 This concept notes: “Article 29. Restrictions Regarding Interpretation. No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: a). permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; b). restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party; c}. precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or d}. excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have. 52 Advisory Opinion OC-5/85. November 13, 1985. Series A No. 5, in regard to Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), para. 51 and 52.