70 172. The Court notes that the courts, which heard the instant case, indicated that: i) the mistreatment or torture committed against Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel in order to obtain their confession was not confirmed;268 ii) even though it was not proven that the statements before the Public Prosecutor’s Office were invalid as a result of cruel treatment, torture or solitary confinement, Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel confessed, before a competent court on May 7, 1999, to several crimes of which they were convicted; therefore, their confessions would be valid,269 and iii) based on the foregoing, probative value was given to the statements made on that day.270 However, the Court considers that upon comparing between the crimes admitted by Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel in three statements and the final judgment by which they were convicted, it is possible to conclude that they were sentenced for the same crimes they confessed in the statement of May 7, 1999. Indeed, Mr. Montiel Flores was convicted of possession of firearm, while Mr. Cabrera was convicted of possession of a rifle and magazine. 173. In order to analyze the relationship between the three statements, the Court notes that the European Court on Human Rights, in the case of Harutyunyan v. Armenia, indicated that where there is reasonable evidence that a person has been tortured or subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment, the fact that this person ratifies his confession before a different authority other than the one responsible for the first confession, should not automatically lead to the conclusion that such confession is valid. The foregoing because a subsequent confession may be the consequence of the mistreatment suffered by the person and specifically, because of the fear that remains after this kind of experience.271 174. The Court shares the criterion previously described and reiterates that the situations of defenselessness and vulnerability that the individual feels when detained and subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in order to wear down that individual’s psychological resistance and force him to incriminate himself,272 that stir up feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing an individual and possibly breaking his physical and moral resistance. 268 The Fifth District Court declared that the criminal acts “were mainly corroborat[ed] by the statements made by the accused.”.” To this end, it pointed out that “said statements […] were made in the presence of the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Trial Court […] by fully cognizant adults, not subject to neither coercion or violence.” Cf. Judgment handed down on August 28, 2000 by the Fifth District Court, supra note 75, folio 11197 and 11213. 269 The Second Collegiate Tribunal pointed out that “contrary to what the appellants allege, the appealed judgment was not only based on the confessions they made in the record of the case, but the Tribunal admitted said confessions into the other evidentiary items of the proceeding.”.” Furthermore, it indicated that “[e]ven in the event that their initial statements had not been made spontaneously and freely, the ratification made before the court purged any possible procedural irregularities previously committed by the accused; that is why the confessions in question take on legal value and, therefore, the appealed judgment that take them into account providing additional proof to the other evidence on record, does not violate the guarantees.”.” Cf. Judgment of August 14, 2002 issued by the Second Collegiate Tribunal, supra note 84, folios 3139 and 3202. 270 The Second Collegiate Tribunal considered that “it is worth noting that the judgment being appealed was not only based on the confession made by the accused [before] the prosecutor's office of the common and federal jurisdiction, respectively, or before the court that initially heard the case against them; or that the evidence furnished in the original case demonstrated that, prior to the issuance, they had been in solitary confinement and let alone, it does not spring that their statements had been obtained under threats or any form of coercion” Cf. Judgment of August 14, 2002 issued by the Second Collegiate Tribunal, supra note 84, folios 3137 to 3138. 271 272 Cf. ECHR, Case of Harutyunyan v. Armenia, supra nota 261, para. 65. Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of August 18, 2000. Series C N° 69, para. 104; Case of Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala. supra note 218, para. 93, and Case of Tibi v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 7, 2004. Series C No. 114, para. 146.