3 7. This “interaction” becomes, in reality, a “live interaction”6 with intense communicating vessels that bring about “jurisprudential dialogue,” in the sense that both jurisdictions (the domestic and the international) must, necessarily, head to “domestic” and “conventional” norms under certain circumstances. This occurs, for example, regarding the legality of a detention. The action taken by domestic bodies (including the judges), in addition to applying the norms required by the domestic forum, are required to follow the guidelines and rules of those international treatises that the State, in use of its sovereignty, expressly recognized and whose international commitment it assumed. In turn, the international forum must assess the legality of the detention in light of the domestic norms, given that the American Convention itself turns to the domestic legislation in order to examine the conformity with the convention of the actions taken by the domestic authorities, since Article 7(2) of the Pact of San Jose turns to “the constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto” in order to better decide on the legality of the detention as a parameter of conformity with the convention. The domestic judges, on the other hand, must comply with the other provisions enshrined in Article 7 itself so as to not violate the conventional right to personal liberty, also heading to the interpretation that the I/A Court of H.R. has carried out regarding the provisions of said numeral. 8. So as to determine whether the actions of national judges are compatible with the Pact of San José, in certain cases it will be necessary to analyze their actions in light of domestic norms and always heading to the American Convention, especially in order to assess what might be called “the conventional due process standard” (in broad terms).7 This analysis, therefore, can not constitute a “threshold issue,” but rather it essentially represents a “decision on the merits,” where the issue will be discussed, inter alia, of whether an exercise of “the control of compliance” by domestic courts was compatible with the obligations undertaken by the respondent State and in light of Inter-American jurisprudence itself. 9. The prior considerations, of course, do not grant absolute jurisdiction to the I/A Court of H.R. to review, in any case or circumstance, the actions of the domestic judges in light of the domestic legislation, each time this implies a reexamination of the facts, assess the evidence, and render a judgment that may possibly serve to confirm, modify, or reverse a domestic verdict; an issue that clearly exceeds the competence of said international jurisdiction upon substituting 6 Statement by the current president of the I/A Court of H.R., Diego García-Sayán; Cf. His work, “Una Viva Interacción: Corte Interamericana y Tribunales Internos”, [A Live interaction: Inter-American Court and Domestic Tribunals] in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: a Quarter Century: 19702004, San José, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 2005, pp. 323-384. 7 Eventhough “due process” is not stated in an express manner in the American Convention, all the rights of the Pact and the development of the jurisprudence of the I/A Court of H.R., have cerated, In an interesting concurring opinion, Sergio García Ramírez notes that "[...] in its entirety, what might be called “the due process standard” composed of various rights. Among the issues examined most frequently by the Inter-American Court is the so-called due process of law, a concept developed by Anglo-American case law and regulations. The Pact of San José does not invoke “due process” literally. However, with other words, it organizes the system of hearing, defense and decision contained in that concept. It fulfills this mission – essential for the protection of human rights – in different ways and with different provisions, including Article 8, which is entitled “Right to a Fair Trial” (Note: “Judicial Guarantees” in Spanish). The purpose of this article is to ensure that the State bodies called on to determine an individual’s rights and obligations – in many aspects – will do so using a procedure that provides the individual with the necessary means to defend his legitimate interests and obtain duly reasoned and justified rulings, so that he is protected by the law and safeguarded from arbitrariness. (Para. 3, of the concurring opinion formulated, in relation to the Judgment in the Case of Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 19, 2006. Series C No. 151).