4 it for the domestic jurisdiction and violates its essential subsidiary and complimentary nature. Thus, the conventional guarantees rest on the “principle of subsidiarity” mentioned prior, recognized expressly in Articles 46(1)(a) of the American Convention itself, which enshrines as a requisite for the Inter-American bodies, “that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law”; a rule which compliments provision 61(2) of the same Pact, by explicitly providing as a condition for action, that “[i]n order for the Court to hear a case, it is necessary that the procedures set forth in Articles 48 and 50 [be] completed.” (referring to the procedure before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights). 10. The I/A Court of H.R. does not have jurisdiction to become a “new and last resort” in order to resolve the original arguments of the parties from a domestic proceeding. This is clear to the Inter-American Court as it cannot be otherwise. The lucid reflections of an outstanding Inter-American judge are relevant regarding this issue:8 The Inter-American Court, which is responsible for performing a “control of compliance” based on the confrontation of the facts at stake and the provisions of the American Convention, cannot and does not intent –indeed, it never did- to become a new and last resort to hear a controversy originated in the domestic jurisdiction. The idea that the Inter-American Court constitutes a third or fourth instance, and eventually a jurisdiction of last resort, arises from a popular belief that is rooted in reasonable grounds; however, this idea has absolutely no connection with the jurisdiction of the Court, the legal conflict brought before it, the parties to the corresponding proceedings and the nature of international proceedings for the protection of human rights. (underlining added) 11. Therefore, it is deemed that the Inter-American Court has jurisdiction, in certain cases, to review the actions of domestic judges, including the proper exercise of the “control of compliance,” provided that the analysis is derived from an examination carried out regarding the compatibility of domestic actions in light of the American Convention on Human Rights, of its additional Protocols, and of its conventional jurisprudence; without this turning the Inter-American Court into a “court of appeals” or court of “fourth instance,” because its actions are limited to the analysis of certain violations of the international commitments made by the respondent State in each particular case, and not of each and every one of the actions of domestic judicial bodies, which obviously in this latter case would mean to replace the domestic jurisdiction, violating the very essence of the reinforcing and complementary nature of the international tribunals. 12. On the contrary, the I/A Court of H.R. has jurisdiction to hear “matters related to the compliance of the commitments made by State parties”;9 being that the principal objective of the Inter-American Court is “the application and interpretation of the American Convention on Human Rights,”10 from where it derives its jurisdiction to also analyze the due exercise of the “control of compliance” by the domestic judge when there are violations of the Pact of San Jose, an analysis that conventional judge shall carry out, necessarily, upon deciding 8 Para. 3 of the concurring opinion of Judge Sergio García Ramírez, for the judgment issued in the Case of Vargas Areco v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparaciones y Costas, of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 155. 9 Article 33 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 10 Article 1 of the Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.