31 which the Mexican Army operated in Guerrero at the time of the facts of the case, implied an action or policy of the State that led to the constitution of a risk to the physical liberty [of the alleged] victims, […] infringing both articles 1(1) and 7(1) of the American Convention.” 78. The Commission and the State did not submit claims regarding the violation of the right to personal security. Notwithstanding, the State claimed that the participation of the armed forces in the comprehensive security strategy is supported by the Mexican legal framework, which has determined that “this participation is subsidiary, temporary, and only upon request of the civil authorities,” so as to “prevent, discourage, investigate, and prosecute high-impact crimes such as drug trafficking, organized crime, and the use of heavy gauge firearms.” 79. The Court calls to mind that, with regards to Article 7 of the American Convention, it has reiterated that it contains two types of regulations, highly differentiated, one general and one specific. The general one is contained in the first subparagraph: “[e]very person has the right to personal liberty and security.” While the specific one is composed of a series of guarantees that protect the right not to be deprived of liberty unlawfully (Art. 7(2)) or in an arbitrary manner (Art. 7(3)), to be informed of the reasons for the detention and the charges brought against him (Art. 7(4)), to judicial control of the deprivation of liberty (Art. 7(5)), and to contest the lawfulness of the arrest (Art. 7(6)).99 Any violation of subparagraphs 2 to 7 of Article 7 of the Convention necessarily entails the violation of Article 7(1) thereof.100 80. Moreover, the Tribunal has held that security should also be understood as protection against all unlawful or arbitrary interference with physical liberty.101 Likewise, the protection of liberty safeguards both the individuals’ physical liberty and their personal safety, in a context in which the lack of guarantees may result in the subversion of the rule of law and in the deprivation of the minimum forms of legal protection against detainees.102 On the other hand, the European Court of Human Rights has declared that the right to personal security implies protection of physical liberty.103 In turn, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has pointed out that the right to security cannot be construed in a restrictive way, which implies that the State cannot ignore threats to the life of persons who are arrested or otherwise detained.104 99 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C N° 170, para. 51; Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haití, supra note 49, para 89; Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2009. Series C N° 207, para. 143. 100 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. v. Ecuador, supra note 99, para. 54; Case of Barreto Leiva v. Venezuela. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 17, 2009. Series C N° 206, para. 116; Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela, supra note 99, para. 143. 101 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. v. Ecuador, supra note 99, para. 53. 102 Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al) v. Guatemala; supra note 29, para. 135; Case of Acosta Calderón v. Ecuador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 24, 2005. Series C N° 129, para. 56; Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Perú. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2005. Series C N° 137, para. 104. 103 Cf. ECHR, Case of Affaire Villa v. Italy, Judgment of 20 April 2010, App. No. 19675/06, para. 41. 104 According to the Committee, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to security of the person. These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. Hence, the Committee concludes that “[A]n interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.” Cf. United Nations. Committee on Human Rights. Case of Delgado Paez V.