68 166. To this end, the Court has held that the nullification of procedural acts as a result of torture or cruel treatment constitutes an effective measure to end the consequences of the said violation of judicial guarantees.260 In addition, the Tribunal considers necessary to emphasize that the rule of exclusion does not only apply to cases in which acts of torture or cruel treatment have been committed. In this regard, Article 8(3) of the Convention is clear in indicating that “[t]he defendant’s confession is only valid if made without duress of any kind,” that is, it is not limited to the factual situation of torture or cruel treatment, but extends to any form of duress. In fact, upon verifying any type of duress capable of breaking the spontaneous expression of will of a person, this necessarily implies the obligation to exclude the respective evidence from the judicial proceeding. This nullification is a necessary means to discourage the use of any type of duress. 167. On the other hand, this Tribunal considers that the statements obtained under duress are not usually truthful, given that the person tries to assert whatever it is necessary to make the cruel treatment or torture stop. Based on the foregoing, the Tribunal considers that accepting or giving probative value to statements or confessions achieved by a form of duress, which affect the person or a third party, constitutes, in turn, a violation of a fair trial.261 Likewise, the absolute character of the exclusionary rule is reflected on the prohibition of granting probative value not only to the evidence obtained directly under duress, but also to evidence deriving from said act. In consequence, the Court considers that excluding the evidence gathered or derived from information obtained under duress, adequately guarantees the exclusionary rule. 168. Some of these elements of international law are reflected on the Mexican laws. Article 20 of the Constitution, in force at the time of the event, provided that “[a]ny state of solitary confinement, intimidation or torture is prohibited and shall be punished by criminal law.” Confession made before any authority different from the Public Prosecutor’s Office or the court or before them without the assistance of a counsel, shall have no probative value.”262 the Committee on Human Rights has indicated that: “The guarantees of fair trial may never be made subject to measures of derogation that would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights. (…) no statements or confessions or, in principle, other evidence obtained in violation of this provision may be invoked as evidence in any proceedings covered by article 14, including during a state of emergency, except if a statement or confession obtained in violation of article 7 is used as evidence that torture or other treatment prohibited by this provision occurred.”.” United Nations. Committee on Human Rights. General comment No. 32: Right to a fair trial and to equality before courts and tribunals (HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (vol.I)), para.6. 259 Moreover, the Committee agains Torture has indicated that the “broad scope of the prohibition in article 15, proscribing the invocation of any statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture as evidence "in any proceedings", is a function of the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture and implies, consequently, an obligation for each State party to ascertain whether or not statements admitted as evidence in any proceedings for which it has jurisdiction, including extradition proceedings, have been made as a result of torture.”.” United Nations. Committee against Torture. G.K. v. Switzerland, May 7, 2003 (CAT/C/30/D/219/2002), para. 6.10. 260 Cf. Case of Bayarri v. Argentina, supra note 123, para. 108. 261 Cf. ECHR, Case of John Murray v. UK, Judgment of 25 January 1996, App. N°. 41/1994/488/570, paras. 45-46 and Case of Jalloh v. Germany, Judgment of 11 July 2006, App. N°. 54810/00, paras. 121-123. Cf. Similarly, the European Court has indicated that “the use of statements obtained as a result of acts of torture or mistreatments as evidence to assert the facts in a criminal proceeding makes said proceeding completely unfair and this conclusion is independent from the proving value assigned to said statements, or if its use was conclusive for the sentence.”.” ECHR, Case of Gafgen v. Germany, Judgment of 1 June 2010, App. N°. 22978/05, para. 165 and Case Harutyunyan v Armenia, Judgment of 28 June 2007, App. N°. 36549/03, para. 63. 262 Cf. Article 16 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, supra note 124.