71 175. In this respect, the Court already verified that Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel were subjected to cruel and inhuman treatments on the days they were detained in Pizotla, without being timely brought before a competent judicial authority (supra para. 134). From the foregoing, it is possible to conclude that Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel were subjected to cruel treatments in order to break down their psychological resistance and force them to incriminate themselves or confess to certain illegal activities. The cruel treatment showed consequences in the first statements rendered before the Public Prosecutor’s Office, as well as in the statement of May 7, 1999. As a result, the trial court decided to value this fact and not to rule out the allegations presented by the victims. 176. On the contrary, one of the reasonings offered by the trial courts in order not to exclude the evidence from the proceedings was based on that “it is not sufficient that someone alleges that he has been physically or mentally abused for the person to be liberated, since in principle he should prove that such violence existed and that it served as means to obtain the confession, which, at most, would invalidate the confession […].”273 Likewise, expert witness Coronado indicated that "if, from a confession allegedly obtained under torture, it is not proven in the proceeding that there was a person who committed such torture, the confession will be valid.”274 As it was previously mentioned, this Tribunal repeats that the burden of proof for this type of facts lays on the State (supra para. 136) for which it is not valid the argument according to which the petitioner did not fully prove his complaint in order to rule it out. 177. Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the domestic courts, which heard the case in all the stages of the proceeding, should have totally excluded the statements rendered at the Public Prosecutor's Office and the confessions made on May 7, 1999, given that the existence of cruel and inhuman treatment disqualified the probative use of such evidence, according to the international standards previously mentioned. Therefore, the Court declares the violation of article 8(3), in conjunction with article 1(1) of the American Convention, to the detriment of Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel. 3. Presumption of innocence principle 178. The Commission did not allege a violation of this guarantee. The representatives argued that “[t]he form in which the evidence was gathered and valued […] shows that the criminal proceeding was intended, from the very beginning, to prove the guilt of the [victims].” They mentioned that “the body of evidence was divided and that the courts gave value to those items of evidence that, though produced irregularly, were useful to sustain [their] participation […] in an illicit act, excluding those items of evidence that necessarily lead to the conclusion that the evidence has been fabricated and the confessions obtained under torture.” In addition, the courts shifted the burden of proof to the victims and assumed that it was not a duty of the State "to verify that [such] were not coerced confessions.” 273 Likewise, the Fifth District Court expressed that “[e]ven though the accused indicated that when they were arrested, they were tortured […] it is not less true, irrespective of what has been mentioned, that such alleged violence was not proven in the criminal proceeding […] to confirm the versions given in the expansion of the preliminary statement, in defense of the accused, [several] items of evidence were furnished […], however, this evidence is not sufficient to modify the judgment.”.” Cf. Judgment handed down on August 28, 2000 by the Fifth District Court, supra note 75, folio 11220 to 11223. 274 Cf. Expert opinion rendered by expert witness Fernando Coronado Franco at the public hearing in this case.