11 censorship. The judgment of the Court of Appeal of Santiago of January 20, 1997, established that precautionary protection is not censorship, even when it is indefinitely extended. Regarding the grounds for the Supreme Court of Chile’s decision in this case, he believed that it used legal remedies and norms of substantive law improperly, for purposes for which they were not created. When establishing that the honor of the person of Jesus Christ has been violated by a specific artistic or philosophical interpretation and that this affects dignity and freedom of self-determination, according to a person’s beliefs and values, it is confusing the issues, and this signifies that it is not regulating the possible conflict of rights appropriately. Although many people find the film shocking, others find it illustrative and instructive, and it should not be classified as blasphemy. He considers that the Supreme Court decided to suppress declarations made in the film as blasphemous or at least heretical because, in that Court's opinion, they were shocking. However, as it was unable to suppress those declarations, the Supreme Court found an indirect way of doing this, which runs counter to the rational sense of conflict of laws and juridical reasoning. Blasphemy, which is different from heresy, supposes insulting or ridiculing religious figures or beliefs, with no intention of making an artistic reflection or contributing to a debate. With regard to freedom of conscience, in this case we are speaking of freedom of belief, conscience and religion in two ways: one that coincides with freedom of expression and another that implies the freedom to seek and receive information. The freedom to form an opinion or a religious belief and to change it exists; consequently, the ability to receive and seek information is necessary; to the contrary, a person would not have access to all the currents of information and, therefore, could not use them to maintain a belief, to change it, to contest it, or to discuss it with others. In this restricted meaning, he believes that it may be said that the Supreme Court’s judgment violates Article 12 of the Convention. As regards the reform of constitutional legislation, the good faith of the State of Chile is evident. It is also evident that Chilean justice disregards international law, owing to several factors; domestic law and its alleged supremacy, and an excess of work and the resulting difficulty to study new law. It could be counterproductive for the domestic legal system if laws are reformed or a law is enacted every time the Supreme Court disregards the fact that there has been a tacit derogation, because it would be considered that self-executing de jure norms are not applicable in this sphere. The most important reform would be one which authoritatively reminds the Judiciary that de jure incorporation exists. If this reform were carried out, together with the reform of article 19(12) of the Constitution, they would both be more effective. Regarding the self-executing character of international laws in domestic law, laws that establish a mandate to codify and those of a programmatic nature are not selfexecuting; however, laws that establish a subjective right, affirming a right and limiting its restrictions, are self-executing. He indicated that the case of the law that prohibits imprisonment for debt is an example of the practice of the Chilean courts concerning the self-execution of norms contained in human rights treaties ratified by Chile. Any of the Powers of the State may engage its international responsibility. Chile complies with the obligation to guarantee the free and full exercise of the rights