3 attainment of convenient and agreed-upon solutions –when and insofar as possible-, to resolve the dispute based on the will of the litigants, and not only on the decision of the court as a third party. Opting for this alternative in the process –whether completely setting aside the court proceeding, or making certain acts or stages of this proceeding unnecessary- significantly contributes to the opening of feasible avenues to attain the goals sought by justice with respect to human rights. There have been other such acts in previous cases, not only in proceedings before the Inter-American Commission, where the possibility of a friendly settlement sponsored by that body of the system exists explicitly, but also during proceedings instituted before the Court. 10. In the agreement signed by the parties, the Court is asked to “decide on the points of law discussed in this case regarding application of Article 7 of the American Convention on Human Rights [which refers to various aspects of the right to personal liberty and its abridgments and restrictions] within the framework set forth by the Honorable Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its Advisory Opinion Nº 17.” This request entails –and the Judgment deems it so- the possibility that the Court may issue “considerations regarding the conditions of detention of children and, specifically, imprisonment of children” (para. 122). The starting point for said considerations would be the facts that gave rise to the application –the specific facts that Walter David Bulacio was the victim of-, but their content and significance would go beyond the specific case. Of course, the authority of the Court to examine said issues and to issue a ruling on them stems from Article 2 of the Convention, regarding steps that a State must take to fulfill its human rights treaty obligations. 11. In this regard, the Court itself has set forth its criteria in the aforementioned Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, which can serve as a reference point for regulations regarding juvenile offenders and other minors subject, for any reason, to protection by the State. The principles and provisions cited in that Opinion, as well as statements therein, provide a diverse set of governing principles that contribute to the establishment of international standards regarding the matter we are discussing. The collegiate body whose establishment is required may take into account said standards to issue such reflections and recommendations as it may deem pertinent. 12. In my view, this constructive request of the parties, contained in the second clause of the February 26, 2003 agreement, does not mean that the State declines its regulatory authority regarding this matter, which originates in the State’s own rights and obligations, nor does it impede or limit its carrying out such reforms as it may deem pertinent and that are in accordance with its domestic and international duties, based on the national legal system and the San José Covenant. Surely said reforms will be more extensive and detailed than those set forth, in an illustrative and non-exhaustive manner –since they are human rights provisions, always open to progress-, in the Judgment to which I attach this Opinion. They will also follow the same direction as others already carried out, on which the State has provided information and which are mentioned in the Judgment (para. 108.b). The advisory body to be set up (para. 144) may provide valuable assistance for progress in this area of the legal system and of the respective practices. 13. In its regulations regarding offenses by minors and the respective legal reaction, the State legislates and acts on various aspects of a whole, which is justice rendered by a public authority established on the basis of certain principles and concepts of a democratic society. This expression of justice –or this control function of the State- must not only ensure, as it should, the public interest, but also ensure respect for the legitimate interests and rights of private individuals, in accordance