13. The representatives submitted the request for interpretation for the purpose of “determining the meaning and scope of three specific points related to the reparations”, namely: i) “obtaining the free and informed opinion of V. as to whether she considers herself an injured party”; ii) the “implementation of the rehabilitation, ordered as reparations by the Court in favor of M., V. and R.”, and iii) “payment of fees and expenses incurred by the expert witness María Alicia Espinoza.” Accordingly, the Court will proceed to analyze each of these points separately in order to determine whether or not the request is admissible. A. Obtaining the free and informed consent of the girl V. regarding whether she considers herself an injured party 14. The representatives indicated that “[i]t is not clear to th[at] party that the State of Chile has understood the distinction made by the Court between compensation and other reparations,” given that “the State considers that the purpose of the interview with V. was to determine whether she would be considered a victim of the proceeding before the Court”. In this regard, the representatives argued that paragraphs 71, 255, 299 and 313 of the Judgment should be interpreted to mean that “the compensation cannot be disputed.” They added that “”[a]ny other interpretation, would lead to the absurd conclusion that [the] Court has granted the offending State itself the possibility of determining who are the victims of human rights violations, and that the mode of compliance amounts to a further violation of V’s rights by violating her personal privacy.” 15. The State argued that “[t]he purpose of obtaining the free opinion of the girl V. seems to be perfectly clear in the wording of the Judgment”, since it understands that paragraphs 71 and 313 refer to “the need to consult the girl V. regarding the reparations that concern her, especially as regards the compensation payment”. Likewise, the State considered that the way in which paragraph 71 is worded establishes “guarantees […] so that it is not the State, but rather the girl herself who freely decides whether or not she wishes to be considered as an injured party.” It added that “if the consultation with the girl refers to the reparations, the compensation must necessarily be considered as part of these.” 16. The Commission pointed out that “for the purposes of clarifying whether the compensation in favor of V. is conditional upon her expressing her wishes […] an interpretation of the Judgment would be important.” It added that this “interpretation could benefit the process of compliance with this point.” Considerations of the Court 17. The Court emphasizes that, under Article 63(1) of the American Convention, it has inherent powers to order reparations and, specifically, to order the payment of fair compensation to the injured party5. In particular, the Court recalls that the Judgment established the following: “71. As mentioned previously, the girl V. did not participate in the hearing for reasons of force majeure (supra para.13) Based on the preceding considerations, the Court finds no grounds to consider that the girl V. is not in the same situation as her sisters (infra paras. 150, 176, 178 and 208). However, for the purposes of reparations, the competent national authority for children 5 Cf. Case of Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador. Interpretation of Judgment on Reparations and Costs, para. 29, and Case of Abrill Alosilla et al. v. Peru. Interpretation of Judgment on Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 21, 2011. Series C No. 235, para. 16. 4