CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE EDUARDO VIO GROSSI ORDER OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF FEBRUARY 20, 2012 PROVISIONAL MEASURES WITH REGARD TO THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES CASE OF FERNÁNDEZ ORTEGA ET AL. With my vote, I concur with the Order indicated in the title. Nevertheless, let the record to show that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter “the Court”) had adopted provisional measures in the case it had “under consideration”, 1 and having issued the judgment, which is "final and not subject to appeal" 2 and which put an end to the case, its jurisdiction with regard to these provisional measures has ended. Henceforth, the Court must only “monitor" compliance with the judgment, 3 and it is therefore not possible for the Court to issue new provisional measures during this monitoring phase, given that the said contentious case is no longer “under its consideration”, that is, the Court has already “tried” the case. Furthermore, it must be recalled that once a judgment is issued, the Court then only issues the judgment on reparations and costs, if it has not done so already,4 interprets both rulings,5 rectifies any clerical errors or errors in calculation that have occurred, 6 monitors compliance7 and reports to the OAS General Assembly on non-compliance.8 The Court has not been granted the authority to order new provisional measures “during the stage of monitoring compliance with the judgment,” and there is no grounds for ordering such measures when a case is at that stage, as that stage’s only purpose (as its name would indicate) is to verify, through reports that the Court requests from the parties,9 whether the State concerned has complied or not with the rulings in the corresponding judgments. Based on this, such measures must be logically understood as part of the ruling, which is “final and not subject to appeal,” that decided the contentious case and which carries the weight of res judicata. Therefore, the measures form part of the obligations of the State concerned, not of the Court, derived from the order therein, that it guarantee that “the injured party be [assured] the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated”10 and adopt the measures necessary to “avoid irreparable damage to persons”11 concerned. Otherwise, the ruling in question would not be final, nor would it adjudicate the case. Therefore, compliance with those measures must be monitored as “part” of the judgment in question and not as if they formed part of a different and autonomous proceeding in which new provisional measures could be ordered, which, in practice, prolong the proceeding. Finally, it is my opinion that the Order to which I concur with my vote should be understood to be part of the monitoring of compliance with the said judgment. This, in 1 Article 67 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Article 63(2), idem. 3 Article 69 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. See the concurring opinions of the undersigned on Orders of compliance with judgments in the cases of Blanco Romero et al. v. Venezuela, Servellón Garcìa et al. v. Honduras and Saramaka v. Suriname, of November of 2011. 4 Article 66 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. 5 Article 67 of the Convention. Article 68 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. 6 Article 76 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. 7 Article 69 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. 8 Article 65 of the Convention. Article 30 of the Statute of the Court. 9 Article 69 of the Rules of Procedure. 10 Article 63(1) of the Convention. 11 Article 63(2), idem. 2