14 conventions are sufficient […] to delegate competence tacitly and automatically to the Court.” Thus, the State considered: That the ruling of the Court is reasonable in the judgment it delivered in the case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, in relation to the possibility of exercising contentious competence with regard to […] instruments […] other than the American Convention; […] but, as Mexico had asserted, it indicated that each inter-American treaty requires a prior specific declaration granting the Court competence. 34. The representative affirmed that the State’s position was “inadmissible” and referred to the Court’s case law. 35. The Commission stated that “the Court has declared violations of Article [7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará], in the understanding that Article 12 of this instrument incorporates a general clause of competence accepted by the States when ratifying or adhering to [the Convention].” It “consider[ed] that there was no reason for the Court to depart from its reiterated criterion.” A.2) Considerations of the Court 36. The State ratified the Convention of Belém do Pará on April 4, 1995, without reservations or limitations (supra para. 32). Article 12 of this treaty indicates the possibility of lodging “petitions” before the Commission relating to “denunciations or complaints of violations of [its] Article 7,” and establishes that “the Commission shall consider such claims in accordance with the norms and procedures established by the American Convention on Human Rights and the Statute and Regulations of the Inter-American Commission.” As indicated by this Court in the case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, “it appears evidence that the literal meaning of Article 12 of the Convention of Belém do Pará grants competence to the Court, by not excepting from its application any of the norms and procedures for individual communications.”22 It should be underlined that, in other contentious cases against Guatemala,23 this Court has declared the State’s responsibility for the violation of Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará and the State has even acknowledged its responsibility for the violation of this precept without questioning the Court’s competence in this regard. 37. Furthermore, the Court notes that Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará refers to measures “to prevent, punish and eradicate” violence against women and, in this regard, is closely related to the rights to life and to personal integrity established in Articles 4 and 5 of the American Convention. Thus, previous considerations of the Court in relation to the pro persona principle support what it has indicated with regard to its competence: The system of international protection should be understood as a whole, [in keeping with the] principle established in Article 29 of the American Convention, which imposes a protection framework that always gives preference to the interpretation or the norm that is most favorable to the rights of the individual, the cornerstone for the protection of the whole inter-American system. Thus, the adoption of a restrictive interpretation with regard to the scope of this Court’s competence would not only be contrary to the object and purpose of the [American] Convention, but would also have an impact on the practical effects of this treaty and on the guarantee of protection that it establishes.24 22 Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 41. In the paragraph of this judgment cited, the Court explained that the “wording” of Article 12 of the Convention of Belém do Pará “does not exclude any provision of the American Convention; thus it must be concluded that, in the petitions under Article 7 of the Convention of Bélem do Pará, the Commission will act ‘pursuant to the provisions of Articles 44 to 51 of [the American Convention],’ as established in Article 41 of this instrument. Article 51 of the Convention […] refers […] expressly to the submission of cases the Court.” 23 Cf. Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 4, 2012. Series C No. 250, para. 17, and Case of Gudiel Álvarez (Diario Militar) v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 20, 2012. Series C No. 253, para. 17. 24 Cf. Case of Vélez Loor v. Panamá. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 23, 2010 Series C No. 218, para. 34; Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”), supra, operative paragraphs 4 and 5; Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and