52
compensate the victims for the harm caused. […] Evidently, while the State is obliged to prevent
human rights abuses, the existence of a specific violation does not, in itself, prove the failure to take
preventive measures.227
136. The obligation of prevention has been indicated specifically with regard to women,
and also girl children, since before 2001, and by instruments other than the Convention of
Belém do Pará,228 a treaty that expressly establishes this in the above-mentioned Article
7(b). In addition, girl children, including those who are adolescent, require special measures
of protection.229 The Court has already had the occasion to state, with regard to women and
girls, that:
The strategy of prevention must be comprehensive; in other words, it must prevent risk factors and
also strengthen institutions so that these can respond effectively to cases of violence against women.
Furthermore, States must adopt preventive measures in specific cases in which it is clear that certain
women and girls may be victims of violence.230
137.
Moreover, as the Court has indicated:
It is clear that a State cannot be responsible for every human rights violation committed among
private persons. Indeed, the States’ treaty-based obligation to ensure rights does not entail an
unlimited responsibility of States in the case of any act or fact of private persons, because its duty to
adopt measures of prevention and protection for individuals in their interrelations is conditioned to
awareness of a situation of real and imminent danger for a specific individual or group of individuals,
and to the reasonable possibilities of preventing or avoiding that danger. In other words, even though
an act or omission of a private person has the legal consequence of the violation of certain human
rights of another private person, this cannot be automatically attributed to the State, because the
227
Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez. Merits, supra, para. 175; Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”), supra,
para. 252, and Case of Luna López v. Honduras. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 10, 2013.
Series C No. 269, para. 118.
228
Thus, the Court has already noted that “CEDAW established that ‘States may also be responsible for
private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of
violence and to provide compensation.” (Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”), supra, para. 254. The respective
document was cited by the Court: “CEDAW, General Recommendation 19: Violence against women (Eleventh
session, 1992), UN Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 84 (1994), para. 9.” In addition, article 4 of the Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence against Women (adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its eighty-fifth
plenary meeting on 20 December 1993) indicates, inter alia, that “States should pursue by all appropriate means
and without delay a policy of eliminating violence against women and, to this end, should: […] (c) Exercise due
diligence to prevent, investigate and, in accordance with national legislation, punish acts of violence against
women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons.” Furthermore, in 1995, the twentyninth paragraph of the Beijing Declaration, adopted at the sixteenth plenary session of the Fourth World
Conference on Women on 15 September 1995, indicated the determination of Governments to “prevent and
eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls.” In addition, subparagraphs (b) and (d) of paragraph 124
of the Platform for Action indicate the obligation of Governments to adopt measures to prevent and investigate acts
of violence against women, including when they are perpetrated by private persons. Guatemala took part in this
Conference, and stated that it “did not accept […] any form of violence against women” and also that “the State
has the obligation to protect women and to provide the conditions to ensure that they may enjoy their rights on an
equal basis.” Cf. Message of the President of the Republic of Guatemala, Ramiro De León Carpio to the Fourth
World Conference on Women, supra. Furthermore, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against
women, its causes and consequences observed that customary international law establishes the State’s
responsibility for violations of human rights of women by private persons. (Inter-American Commission of Women
(CIM) of the Organization of American States, the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal
Justice Policy (ICCLR), and the United Nations Latin American Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders (ILANUD), Women, Justice and Gender Program: Violence in the Americas – A Regional
Analysis Including a Review of the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention for the Prevention,
Punishment and Eradication of Violence against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará) Final Report, July 2001, p.
33. The document cites the following text: “Coomaraswamy, Radhika (1995). Preliminary report submitted by the
Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, in
accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/45. Geneva: United Nations Commission on Human
Rights, fiftieth session (E/CN.4/1995/42).”
229
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has indicated that “adolescents up to 18 years old are holders of
all the rights enshrined in the Convention [on the Rights of the Child]; they are entitled to special protection
measures.” Committee on the Rights of the Child. General Comment No. 4: Adolescent health and development in
the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. UN Doc. CRC/GC/2003/4, 21 July 2003, paras. 1 and 2.
230
Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”), supra, para. 258.